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Localized Final Solutions
Nazi Extermination Process(es) 
from a Micro to a Macro Scale of Action
SILVIA ANTONIA ICĂ
Fitting perfectly into the category of events that reshaped the humanistic 
perception of the ”good-evil” dichotomy, the Holocaust haunted the mind of 
historians since 1945. Undoubtedly regarded as the climax of the Second World War 
in terms of conflict escalation and celerity of results, this particular event constituted a 
fundamental element for the shaping of post-war societies, associated explicitly with 
the image of a stereotypical fascist movement characterized by violence, xenophobia 
and moral nihilism. 
In scientific terms, fascism is the most ambiguously formulated political concept 
of the last century, at the same time being charged with all sorts of encompassing 
meanings. In many cases devoid of all specificity, the academic discourse on this 
delicate topic has created an unhealthy blurred image, in continuous search of 
new colonial territories, which eventually led to an amalgam of misrepresentations 
entirely out of line with the historical reality of the ages. Although agreeing that 
the fascist movement was in its essence a unique apparition on the socio-political 
tableau, there is no general consensus upon a working definition of the term, the 
only convergence point of the scholars being that of a genesis of terminology. The 
German Fascist movement and its product, National Socialism, continue to represent 
the most atypical form ever expressed, questioning on every occasion all attempts of 
reaching a harmonious unanimity. The insights provided by Hannah Arendt in the 
1960s seem to contradict all classic theories which tabulate National Socialism in the 
category of fascist, totalitarian movements, by arguing that the totalitarian framework 
is the means of destruction, certainly not its basic explanation; totalitarian leaders do 
not believe in the promoted ideology, but use it to control and mobilize the masses. 
Therefore, Hitler’s Anti-Semitic National Socialism cannot fit into this category1. The 
Führer’s ideological obsession was a chameleonic one; it managed to extrapolate its 
form out of the context it was living in by making use of integrationist movements 
and racial nationalism.
Probably one of the most difficult tasks of students of the fascist movement and its 
German identification is prediction of future research directions and strictly connected 
to this, a selection process which will bring back on the menu some of the buried 
perspectives. Ultimately, the topic at hand will continue to fascinate both researchers 
and passionate readers due to its infinite exploratory options, which always present 
the same entry points, but never reach the same conclusive gates. For countries 
of the former communist bloc, the problem of interpretation and establishment of 
1 François FURET, Unanswered Questions: Nazi Germany and the Genocide on the Jews, 
Schocken, New York, 1989, p. 35.
516
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XIII • no. 3 • 2013
SILVIA ANTONIA ICĂ
importance of the events go much deeper, in comparison to the distanced West. Here, 
the debate is by no means directed towards the future of research, but rather focused 
on attenuation of severe discrepancies in the field caused by the former communist 
rule and its isolationist, punitive tendencies. A great step forward has been taken 
with the opening of the former communist archives, which now allow East-European 
researchers to gather up the threads of the individual stories making up the genocidal 
puzzle. 
In light of the new opportunities provided, the historiography of the Holocaust 
in Europe and its climax, meaning the institutionalization of the ”Final Solution” 
has brought to light numerous important aspects, often ignored in the struggle of 
understanding the abominable events. Being impossible to place on the temporal 
axis, the final decision which led to the attempted genocide of Jewry all around the 
continent and with further expansion on a global level after the end of the war, still 
poses more questions than it answers. Public debates between those who struggled 
to understand this experience were much heated immediately after the disclosure 
of the Nazi genocidal machinery, unsurprisingly shedding light upon the post-war 
German society who was now desperately trying to shift focus from the historical 
events, because of their charging significance. The appearance amongst historians 
of several major interpretative tendencies with regard to the official incipient phase 
of the extermination policy further polarized the universal understanding of this 
phenomenon, polarization which provided the perfect opportunity for the advocates 
of Holocaust denial to question the validity and therefore existence of any sort of 
”Final Solution” and its decisional framework. Postulating a variety of possible 
scenarios, almost all of them revolving around the famous Wannsee Conference from 
January 20th 1942, scholars managed in creating a truly blurred projection of their own 
reality, carefully chosen to sustain in an irrefutable manner their own argumentation. 
Needless to say, they failed in reaching a consensus on the basis of all collected 
evidence, which still take sides depending on the user’s perspective of the matter, 
leaving much room for interpretation. The political sensitivity of this problematic, 
transcending to a certain level the perpetrator-victim denomination, takes up a whole 
new importance in the sense that even 70 years later, if clarified could point fingers 
and name names. 
The documentation difficulties and methodological barriers encountered when 
writing this study have made it hard to follow a classical approach, leaving behind the 
idea of reconciling historical information with empirical research of different archival 
resources. Therefore, the stipulation of a new objective is needed before going any 
further. A simple reevaluation of the dynamics of the ”Final Solution” as understood 
today, its historiography and argumentation, but also the purposes to which the latter 
is intended, has revealed the need for a different kind of study with respect to its 
genesis and decisional process. Specifically, the next pages will be concerned with 
answering the following questions:
Was the idea of extermination of the European Jewry existent in Hitler’s mind − 
previous to the implementation of Operation Barbarossa?
Was there a final order which initiated the mass killings?− 
Is there a causal connection between the decision of extermination and the − 
successful eradication results of the regional samples in the East?
Although the justification of such an endeavor can be considered far too 
comprehensive and with too many penetrating layers, the proposed thematic 
struggles to intercept the more than various ideas which compile it, moving beyond 
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the pure historical perspective, to a relational and rational approach of the course 
of events. Furthermore, this rather experimental tentative comes in light of acute 
lack of an exclusive, comprehensive study on the origins and implementation 
of the Final Solution, a topic on which the few remarkable contributions spell the 
name of Christopher Browning. Not only such inter-relational attempts are scarce 
internationally, but they lack completely in the Eastern part of the European continent, 
where in fact they could prove to be the most worthy and perhaps fruitful in terms 
of results. Departing from the above mentioned research questions, the alternative 
working hypothesis is the following: the regional and local decisions of implementing 
genocidal policies made by Nazi leaders and their collaborators determined the 
universal character of the Final Solution, thus evolving from a micro to a macro scale 
of action.
Thus, the paper will attempt, and hopefully succeed in proving that the decision 
for implementing a final solution and therefore beginning the process of total 
extermination of the Jewish people didn’t necessarily come to mind until it was 
already implemented at a local level on the Eastern front. More to the point, the final 
inspiration for employing mass destruction techniques came from places like Ukraine 
and the Baltic Countries, which in the context of failing solutions such as deportation 
and ghettoization proved to be the only remaining alternative in order to get rid once 
and for all of the ”unwanted” elements. 
In terms of argumentation structure, division is made between three main parts, 
each with its own supporting part for the main hypothesis. Thus, the first part will 
be dedicated to explaining the background of the fundamental problem, shedding 
light upon the several ideas the Nazi leadership unsuccessfully tried to implement 
in order to solve the difficult situation. The main focus will constitute here what 
Browning specifically names ”the three-ex system”: Expulsion, Exploitation and 
finally, when all others fail to provide the wanted results, Extermination1. The second 
part is concerned with the analysis of the Final Solution as a decisional process, 
emphasizing its labyrinth like itinerary from the design stage to the point where it was 
fully operational, whereas the final part puts under microscope a small slice of Nazi-
occupied Ukraine, with the purpose of observing ground-policies implementation 
and the wider context they helped develop. At the end, the critical point which any 
future reader should be able to identify is that in order to understand the process of 
extermination in its resulting magnitude, one must mandatorily look at it as a mosaic 
of very small pieces, which put together created one of the most horrendous paintings 
history has so far provided.
The main question which still remains unanswered is whether Hitler and 
implicitly the Nazis started out their domination with the already implanted idea 
that Jews must physically disappear from the face of a brand new Europe, dominated 
by the German nation. During the 1970s and 1980s the issue of ”intention” became 
the core paradigm around which the academic environment revolved, leading to 
the birth of two major tendencies, or approaches: intentionalist vs.structuralist/
functionalist. While the former underlined on all levels Adolf Hitler’s ideology, will 
and pre-determined planning of all actions, the latter viewed things from a totally 
different angle, illustrating the Final Solution and all extermination policies not as a 
1 Christopher R BROWNING, The Origins of the Final Solution. The Evolution of Nazi Jewish 
Policy, September 1939-March 1942, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2004, p. 27.
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sudden decision, but as a slow emergence of an idea1. With the beginning of the 1990s, 
Holocaust studies shifted directions from the upper mentioned dichotomy, now facing 
yet another crucial topic: the origins of the Final Solution and strictly connected to it 
the role of Hitler in the decisional process. This new debate brought together some 
sort of consensus on very specific issues, such as the centrality of the year 1941 and 
the fact that Hitler indisputably played a key role in the entire decisional process. 
Before going deeper into the analysis of the origins of this radical decision which will 
make the primary subject of the second part of this paper, it is worth taking a closer 
look at certain decision-making patterns practiced by the Nazis when dealing with 
their racial empire building in the East. 
The idea of a Germanic people with insufficient living space has been haunting 
the minds of many ever since the Middle Ages, but it was only in the 20th century 
that the term ”Lebensraum” was associated with such an important meaning. Hitler 
saw in it the perfect motivation for justifying the imperialist tendencies of Germany, 
having in mind the future growth of the population and with it, the ever-growing 
economic needs. Moreover, the need for a future German colonization of the East is 
specifically detailed in his Mein Kampf, somehow predicting the up-coming continental 
bloodshed2.
Being a rather ignored topic for many who chose to tackle the difficulty of 
National Socialist ideology, the relationship between European imperialism, Nazism 
and the Holocaust cannot be ignored. However, the Nazis were much more successful 
in combining the main tendencies of German imperialism than any other pre-war 
political organization, by managing to introduce them into the much more complex 
ideological structure. Under Hitler’s ”consensual dictatorship”3, imperialism was 
completely absorbed into the party program, and further employed to create the 
necessary bonds (where they were lacking) within the party leadership. Inheriting 
a very durable and arborescent ideological tradition, the Nazis did nothing but 
embrace the already existent Lebensraum, to which they cunningly added economic 
and legitimizing, popularizing interests. Initially of little value even for the early Nazi 
ideologues such as Feder and Rosenberg, who were more or less flirting with the 
idea of imperialism only for strengthening the party’s nationalistic credentials, this 
tendency was neither imposed obsessively by Hitler himself at the beginning, only in 
a large, conventional and contextual sense. The preoccupation for foreign policy was 
substantially increased after the failed coup of 1923 and the writing of Mein Kampf, 
when Hitler’s world view becomes much more structured. The reasoning which lies 
behind this shift in priorities is not clear yet, but most speculations are based on the 
significance of Hitler’s imprisonment time, when he indisputably became acquainted 
with geopolitical theories, especially developed by Haushofer and others like him4. 
Nonetheless, one must not ignore the political context of this event, which also 
helps in understanding Hitler’s insistence on foreign policy. The schematization of 
a very well thought structure helping him take over by legal means, which revolved 
1 IDEM, Nazi Policy, Jewish Workers, German Killers, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 1.
2 Adolf HITLER, Mein Kampf, vol. 2, transl. by Ralph Manheim, Houghton Mifflin Com-
pany, 1998, (originally published in 1926), p. 453.
3 Robert GELLATELY, Ben KIERNAN, The Specter of Genocide. Mass Murder in Historical 
Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 243.
4 Karl Dietrich BRACHER, The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, and Effects of 
National Socialism, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1970, p. 122.
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around creating unity inside the NSDAP was yet another reason for the shifting 
interests. Moreover, imperialism would play a key role for the Nazis in finding the 
middle-ground with German Big Business, whose financial and public support they 
desperately needed.
At first glance, the circulating versions of German imperialism managed one 
way or another to transcend class struggle, becoming a very attractive idea for the 
multi-layered, heterogeneous society. Serving its future purpose almost impeccably, 
the imperialistic ideology became a universal catalyzer which had the sole power of 
uniting very remote interests and ideologies, making sufficient room for reconciliation 
and even cooperation. By 1930, Hitler’s foreign policy framework was already in a 
final form, after this stage only suffering very minor modifications. Revolving around 
the same ”lebensraum-nian” axis, he further developed the necessary antagonism 
between Germany and the rest of the world, justifying the need for conflict through 
the more important need for agricultural space. In his eyes, there was nothing more 
important than the protection of an independent peasantry that would ensure the 
wealth of the entire German empire: 
”History has taught us that a nation can exist without cities, but history 
would have taught us one day, if the old system had continued, that a nation 
cannot exist without farmers…Lasting successes a government can win only if 
the necessity is recognized for the securing of a people’s Lebensraum and thus 
of its own agricultural class”1.
However, the Nazis did more than to rely exclusively on Lebensraum when talking 
about imperialist policies. Taking things to the next level, they wrongly incorporated the 
economic ideas primarily absorbed in Weltpolitik which were on all levels incompatible 
to their initial priorities2. The geopolitical circumstances of the time combined with a 
rather flexible Nazi ideology from this point of view led the German government to 
take a series of contradictory and eventually catastrophic measures during the war. 
The permanent hunt for the living space was also translated into changing alliances, or 
at least that is what the Nazis imagined in the first place. Because the main idea was to 
find this kind of ”manna” in the East, and that implied dealing with the Russian state, 
the need for anti-Russian inclination was of paramount importance. Nourished also 
by the imminent danger of Judeo-Bolshevism threatening to take over the West, this 
fundamental split shortly became the foundation of German policy, destroying any 
sort of cooperative relations that might have existed in the recent years. France was 
more or less in the same situation, but for different reasons. Emphasizing the need for 
German hegemonic supremacy at a continental level, Hitler and the Nazi elite saw 
the urgent need of recovering the damage provoked at Versailles, and France was the 
main target. On this occasion however, Hitler’s rationale stepped out of the radical-
conservative pattern he had so far embraced. Perfectly aware that there would be no 
continental friends for Germany except fascist Italy, he sought the support of what he 
1 Norman H. BAYNES, The Speeches of Adolf Hitler April 1922-August 1939, vol. 1, Howard 
Fertig, New York, 1969, p. 385.
2 Woodroff S. SMITH, The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1986, p. 245.
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considered to be the Germany’s ”natural ally”1, Great Britain, who in order to protect 
its statute as the greatest sea power would inherently seek collaboration with the 
much superior Germany. Needless to say, the results were not as initially predicted.
Until the rise of National Socialism, the differences between the imperialist 
ideologies in Germany were never truly overcome, still preserving their dualistic 
features. The prototype vigorously promoted by Nazis was instantaneously a hit 
mainly because of their exploitation in terms of public attitudes, which were already 
polished by the difficult experiences of the past decades. The first years of war reshaped 
Germany as a very impressive territorial empire, at the cost of fighting against almost 
all great powers, including USSR and the United States. The impossibility of victory 
in the East and failure in the procurement of the coveted Lebensraum, alongside with 
the conflicting economic strategy and Weltpolitik spoke very loud in terms of policy 
efficiency. Therefore, strategies had to be changed on all fronts, and more importantly 
the culprits had to be pointed out for the system to keep functioning. 
Tracing the roots of Jewish Question has proved to be more than challenging, each 
theory being intrinsically connected to the pan-European character of anti-Semitic 
history. Symbolizing all that which was threatening and beyond understanding, 
the Jewish antagonistic view, especially in relation to the Christian world, quickly 
developed into xenophobic anti-Semitism, through the rapid spread of stereotypical 
values. Being labeled as primarily nonbelievers, with a predisposition to commerce and 
urbanism as a way of life, Jews were amongst the first victims of European pogroms, 
developing a reputation which unfortunately would last for more than a millennium. 
Moreover, although initially a religious-based conflict, along with the passage of 
centuries this promoted anti-Judaism would take on various dimensions, including 
economic, political and social ones2. After the Middle Ages, which were a total fiasco 
in terms of Jewish acceptance, the gradual secularization of modern Europe combined 
with a more scientifically-based social and political context somehow declined the 
anti-Semitic wave, thus propelling the remaining Jews back into both Western and 
Eastern European societal strata. However, due to historical events, it was now clear 
that the new Jewish conglomerate was the East, who had embraced it in desperate 
times because of the great economic potential it announced. But there was yet another 
factor which predicted great changes for the European Jewish minority: the so-
called ”Dual Revolution” which announced the emergence of liberal and nationalist 
doctrines, along with profound social and economic transformations, thus allowing 
all kinds of minorities to dream of equality before the law, right to free speech, to 
education and so on. Even for the long-molested Jews from autocratic Germany, this 
could mean only good news, as they finally had the opportunity to take a step further 
from their declining traditional values which had ruled their lives for long. Never 
have they been so wrong. Without catching any break, they soon became associated 
with the destruction of European traditional values, but this time from a much worse 
perspective. 19th century society was keeping religious values in the remoteness of 
its complexity; therefore explanations had to be found elsewhere. For the first time, 
Jewish behavioral patterns were turned into with racial characteristics, paving the 
1 Andreas HILLGRUBER, Germany and the Two World Wars, transl. by William C. Kirby, 
Harvard University Press, 1982, p. 45.
2 Christopher BROWNING, The Origins of the Final Solution…cit., p. 3.
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way for the much more devastating and fruitful future threats1. Browning puts this 
aspect in an impeccably non-confusing manner: ”If previously the Christian majority 
pressured Jews to convert and more recently to assimilate, racial anti-Semitism 
provided no behavioral escape. Jews as a race could not change their ancestors. They 
could only disappear”2.
The beginning of the Second World War and the victorious taking-over of 
National Socialism would open up a can of worms which had long been sealed. Jews 
were about to experience the greatest and most violent racist escalation in their entire 
history, culminating with the government-sponsored extermination policy better 
known as the Final Solution. 
Apart from the historical roots of German anti-Semitism, the expansion of 
eugenics movement and the structural organization of the Nazi state apparatus, 
there is yet another context which is of paramount importance when studying the 
origins of the Final Solution. The failed plans for major population resettlement and 
the Nazi leadership’s unattainable dreams in terms of demographic engineering 
during 1939-1941 were all evidence of the incapacity of the government to solve the 
Jewish problem, frustrations leading to radicalized measures in terms of anti-Jewish 
policy, up to the point when ethnic cleansing was decided. During the two years 
that preceded the climax of the Shoah, Nazi anti-Jewish policies could be defined in 
three words: expulsion, exploitation and ghettoization. Here, it is necessary to make 
an important observation, one which was unfortunately for a long time ignored by 
students of the Holocaust. After 1939, the priorities of the Nazis were to get rid of all 
Jewish population by relocating it in a territory yet to be chosen. In reality, because 
of failing on every attempt to do so, they had to quickly improvise, thus the idea of 
ghettoization. In other words, although many have taken the policy of ghettoization 
as being self-contained and with the role of preparation for the further genocide, in 
its complexity this step represented nothing more than a temporary solution for the 
baffled Nazi policy-makers.
On September 21st 1940 Hitler approved the deportation of Jews into the non-
German area, making references to a Judenstaat which would ultimately be placed 
around the city of Lublin, in this way clarifying that what he had previously 
considered, meaning the deportation of Jews over the borderline of newly conquered 
territories would not be sufficient to solve the problem. The Jews had to be placed in 
their reservations, located as far as possible from the Reich but still inside the German 
empire, where the Nazis could be in total control of their fate. This was to be called the 
Nisko Plan, after the Polish city that would become the borderline of the ”Jewish cage”. 
It was Eichmann who wanted at all costs to prove his organizational capacities on this 
occasion, especially after emigration policies of which he was responsible for had long 
faded away. His career rested upon the turn of a die, so this was for him the perfect 
opportunity to adapt to the new favorable circumstances. In his quest for grandeur, 
Eichmann further expanded the deportation plans, increasing the Jewish transports 
both in number of individuals and frequency, at the same time managing to preserve 
the ”certain voluntary character and obtain an unobtrusive as possible departure of 
1 George L. MOSSE, Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism, Howard Fertig 
Publishing, New York, 1997, p. 69.
2 Christopher BROWNING, The Origins of the Final Solution…cit., p. 5.
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the transport”1. There is much to be discussed around Eichmann’s individual actions, 
which towards the end of the program were actually managing to change the nature 
of the whole organizational system, but what is sure by now is that the whole process 
was stopped from the above, not by its malfunctioning in terms of results. Then again, 
it didn’t have much time to prove its efficiency, either. The orders coming from the 
Reich Security Main Office clearly commanded that all Jewish evacuations had to be 
stopped immediately, including any future action plans2. Unable to save his entire 
ambitious collage, Eichmann could only make sure that the last transports which were 
already too far-ahead in terms of preparation, reach their destination. The motivation 
for stopping all actions on this front was neither the emerging conflict between Jews 
and the local populations from the relocation sites, nor the willingness to preserve 
good relations with the Soviet structures. As usually, the problem came from a shift 
in priorities at the Nazi leadership level, which determined Himmler himself to give 
the stop order. The legitimacy of Himmler’s decision was, according to him, given by 
the technical difficulties the transports have encountered, but in reality this was not 
the case3. The real motivation was that Himmler, who had been recently put in charge 
with the relocation of the Baltic Germans, had the difficult task of finding the living 
space for tens, even hundreds of thousands of people which the Reich was calling 
home. All throughout the year of 1940, these long thought deportation plans which 
were meant to drastically rarify the Jews went hand in hand with the relocation policy 
of the ethnic Germans. Moreover, even if refusing to admit so initially, the Nazis did 
eventually realize that they were facing a difficult choice: to keep working on expulsion 
and deportation policies in order to solve the Jewish issue, or to fortify the desired 
Lebensraum through the resettlement of the Germans from the outside of the Reich’s 
borders. The apparent incompatibility between these two problems led the officials to 
procrastinate a clear solution of the Jewish situation, giving priority to the imperialist 
doctrine Hitler had initially envisioned. The experiment Eichmann designed was to 
be a serious wakeup call for the government, in the sense that it perfectly illustrated 
its limitations in terms of local vs. central policy implementations.
In terms of racial policy, theory became practice the very moment when Hitler’s 
army returned victorious from the French battlefields. This exhilaration provoked by 
the sweet taste of victory had a number of important consequences, among which 
winning the definitive and irrevocable support of the army, especially concerning 
Nazi racial policy. Once again, one of the newly appointed officials, expert in Jewish 
matters, namely Rademacher, took advantage of the euphoric circumstances and the 
so-far useless contributions of Goering and Frank, and went over everyone’s heads, 
reaching up to Hitler himself. The current situation presented much better options, 
such that in addition to Jewry, Poles could also be included in the deportation equation. 
Once with the prospects of annexation of territories in the West, the German Jewish 
question was no longer German; for the first time it had become a European problem, 
which the Nazi ideologues felt responsible to solve, at any cost. The announcement 
of a favorable international context, with France almost obliged to put at German 
disposal its entire colonial inheritance and Great Britain seriously pondering upon 
1 Doron RABINOVICI, Eichmann’s Jews: The Jewish Administration of Holocaust Vienna, 1938-
1945, Polity, Cambridge, 2011, p. 57. 
2 Yad Vashem Archives, O-53/93/235–38, R. Gunther Tagesbericht, October 19, 1939.
3 Christopher BROWNING, The Origins of the Final Solution…cit.., p. 42.
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the option of a peace treaty, provided the perfect framework for the adoption of a new 
approach, this time a much more ”exotic” one: the Madagascar Plan. From a purely 
psychological perspective, the failure of yet another perfectly designed plan that 
was supposed to have no impediments rendered the Nazis catatonic, thus contribu-
ting a great deal to the emergence of a different kind of Final Solution, a much more 
radical one.
Rademacher’s proposal was not an original one, however. Dating back to the 
1930s already, the idea of using this remote African island for creating a Jew-free 
Europe constituted an attraction point for French, Polish and even British anti-Semitic 
thinkers1. After spreading the word on all layers of German structure, including the one 
in the General Government, confidence in the success of this approach skyrocketed to 
such a point that even the construction of Polish ghettos was immediately suspended, 
”in light of the new plan of the Führer”2. In practical terms, the Madagascar idea was 
overflowing with simplicity: Jews were to be taken there by multiple cargo ships, 
where they would be allowed to have a great degree of autonomy. Furthermore, 
the financial burden of providing basic necessities was to be lifted off the German 
shoulders by scraping a common Jewish fund with all their belongings, with the 
purpose of helping them become independent, once arriving on the island. Needless 
to say, in the eyes of the architects this degree of independence, seen as a magnanimous 
gesture, was also beneficial in terms of propagandistic actions, envisioning Germany 
and its Führer as merciful gods. Nevertheless, by the end of December 1940 the 
Madagascar proposal was still pointlessly awaiting its signature on Heydrich’s desk3. 
However serious this planning was taken by all Nazi officials, Germany’s inability to 
defeat Great Britain rendered all preparations mute. It was only a victorious Germany 
that came up with such an idea, and a defeated one that finally let it go, adding yet 
another massive failure on the attempts list and simultaneously heading with rapid 
steps toward systematic mass murder. Since the creation of the ”super-ghettos” in 
Madagascar and Lublin was no longer an option, ghettoization policy became the 
only solution for keeping under control the masses of Jews which were incorporated 
with the annexation of Polish territories into the Reich.
At the local level, German authorities were caught by surprise when hearing that 
they now had to deal with ghettos’ organization on the long run. With very scarce 
guide lines from the higher hierarchy which still refused to accept that deportation 
plans were no longer viable, Nazi commanders on the ground now had to deal with 
the fact that the Jews were cogged up, thus the necessity to take matters into their own 
hands. In light of this new, unpredicted situation, there were many variables which 
had to be taken into consideration: enforcing a security policy that would prevent 
any mutiny inside the ghetto, the desire justified through the need to pillage any 
Jewish valuable and invaluable belongings and the exploitation of Jewish labor force 
1 Philip FRIEDMAN, ”The Lublin Reservation and the Madagascar Plan: Two Aspects of 
Nazi Jewish Policy during the Second World War”, in IDEM,  Roads to Extinction. Essays on the 
Holocaust, ed. by Ada June Friedman, Jewish Publication Society of America, New York, 1980, 
p. 43. Although I do not agree with Friedman’s hypothesis that Madagascar and all the similar 
plans were only intended as covers for the Nazi’s true intentions, I do find his insights about 
the development of these actions very helpful.
2 Christopher BROWNING, The Origins of the Final Solution…cit., p. 84.
3 Karl A. SCHLEUNES, Legislating the Holocaust: The Bernhard Loesner Memoirs and 
Supporting Documents, Westview Press, New York, 2001, p. 49.
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combined with the resources needed to sustain it were some of the aspects which were 
determined on a regional or local basis, with no consensus regarding a certain pattern 
to be followed in terms of policy implementation1. In the context created by the new 
ghettoization policy, individuality of actions both from the part of the Nazis and their 
victims were of paramount importance. While the latter distinguished themselves 
through maintaining a high level of cultural activities and spiritual resilience, thus 
refusing to participate to their dehumanization, the former were characterized by 
the authority of their own personal ambitions, more often than not with an economic 
character. The ”attritionists-productionists” disjuncture which was created particularly 
based on these individualistic aspects perfectly illustrate the above-mentioned traits. 
This dilemma which quickly arose in the minds of the commanders, which postulated 
either starvation or production, was never entirely solved, not least at a universally 
agreeable level. Jews in Lodz were living under different rules than those in Cracow, 
some ghettos were self-sufficient while others rested upon German financing, which 
basically meant victims were starving to death because they weren’t prioritizing enough. 
In the end, even Nazi ghetto commanders saw the burden that their jobs had become, 
physically and psychologically exploiting their prisoners under conditions hard to 
imagine. However, they did manage to preserve death quotas on a reasonable level 
given the circumstances in which Jews were living, thus indicating no intention of any 
sort of further extermination planning. Through most of their policy implementation, 
the majority of local leaders showed desire not to radicalize the situation, but instead 
to bring it to an economic bearable level, one that would prove useful until the Reich 
decided once and for all what to do with the great number of inhabitants. They would 
no longer have to wait, as with the implementation of Operation Barbarossa, the onset 
of the Holocaust was just around the corner.
The thousands of books, articles and international conferences having as a 
core subject the origins of the Final Solution were never enough to put an end to 
all the controversies regarding it. Not only this, but the gaps created by the lack of 
instrumental information and the creation of what appears to be a vicious circle of 
disagreement have greatly heated public debates in countries focused on the study of 
the Holocaust, thus hardening the perception of the phenomenon in its encompassing 
reality. In order to make the passage from the previously discussed antecedents 
which allowed the escalation of the Jewish situation, to the comprehensive analysis 
of the decisional process of the Final Solution one must be absolutely aware of the 
interpretative opportunities that historical documentation offers. Furthermore, the 
focusing points for testing the hypothesis of the present paper revolve around the 
high significance of individual actions and of certain temporal dates. More than 
half a century later, the possibility of accurately reconstructing any chain of events 
from the period between 1940 and 1945 is long gone, that is if it ever existed. Apart 
from the obvious difficulties caused by the human damages of the war and its 
aftermath, meaning the trials, the question of documentations and whether or not 
they existed poses a very big impediment in deciding the ”when” and the ”who” 
of the extermination process. In light of these aspects, the present part of the paper 
is focused on establishing, limited as it may be, some ground rules for the modern 
interpretation of this subject, the opening statement being represented by a small 
discussion on the notion of ”intention”.
1 Christopher BROWNING, The Origins of the Final Solution…cit., p. 113.
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Based on the evidence available to the scientific community, it is impossible to 
certainly assert the exact moment when Hitler decided that a mass extermination 
process should be applied to all European Jewish population. The already mentioned 
intentionalist vs. functionalist dichotomy and its ongoing debate has wrongly traced 
the origins of Nazism to the early 1870’s, implicitly the pre-Nazi German (and let us not 
forget, European) anti-Semitism, thus making it a basic explanation for the National 
Socialist movement rise to power, when in fact it was only a perfectly mastered tool. 
Among the rather phantasmagoric interpretations which question the emergence of 
a final solution as a latent decision, it is indeed worth mentioning the one of Lucy 
Dawidowicz. Her unique approach if we consider the time she was publishing, 
stipulates the idea that Hitler’s intention to exterminate the Jews dates back to the 
end of the First World War1. Moreover, the whole expansionist policy which Hitler 
obsessively implemented all throughout the Second World War was nothing more 
than the means to obtain his goal. The equivalency of Jews with Bolsheviks therefore 
perfectly justifies his plans for a massive invasion of the Russian territory. Needless to 
point out, the inaccuracy of these kinds of rationalizations was proven on all fronts. 
If the intentionalist approaches are basically equivalent in terms of disproof 
simplicity, the functionalist ones are much more challenging. Here, the closeness and 
equal plausibility of each of the proposed alternatives provide no clear demarcation 
line, or at least not a significant one. The first to propose a temporal interval in which 
the decision had to be taken was also one of the first historians who examined the 
overall decisional process of the Final Solution. Therefore, Leon Poliakov suggests that 
a final decision regarding the Jewish question had to be made ”some time between 
the end of the Western campaign in June 1940 and the attack on Russia a year later”2. 
From this moment on, all other versions of what is practically an identical story revolve 
around the same temporal framework. It is Raul Hilberg however, who manages to 
set up a research trend in what is considered today to be the first comprehensive 
and complete study of the Holocaust, and implicitly of the problematic of the Final 
Solution. With a much more prudent approach when compared to the ones of his 
predecessors, Hilberg’s insights offer as a critical nexus Goering’s letter to Heydrich 
from July 31st 1941, which among others empowered the latter to take whatever 
measures he deemed necessary for solving the Jewish Question3. Further reinforcing 
the functionalist thesis, Hilberg perfectly illustrates the emerging aspect of the genoci-
dal idea, rather than its sudden blooming. In stark opposition to this new perspective, 
one of the former expert witnesses to the 1960’s war crimes trials, namely Helmut 
Krausnick, offers a very skeptical view with regard to the impossibility of determining 
an exact moment at which Hitler could have made the decision. Nevertheless, by his 
reasoning the limit had to be set somewhere by the end of March 1941, emphasizing 
the importance of Jewish emigration policy annulment two months later. The upper 
mentioned correspondence between Goering and Heydrich are seen as nothing more 
than a formality, necessary to legalize the whole procedural framework of a decision 
already taken. The subtle, yet still perceivable discrepancies between the multiple 
1 Lucy S. DAWIDOWICZ, The War against the Jews: 1933-1945, Bantam, New York, 1975, 
pp. 147-165.
2 Leon POLIAKOV, Harvest of Hate: the Nazi Program for the Destruction of the Jews of Europe, 
revised edition, Schocken Books, New York, 1979, p. 106.
3 Raul HILBERG, The Destruction of the European Jews, Chicago, Quadrangle, 1961, p. 142.
526
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XIII • no. 3 • 2013
SILVIA ANTONIA ICĂ
theories cannot go by unexplained. As demonstrated previously, up until 1940 the 
Nazi policy was directed towards emigration and later on, deportation of the Jewish 
minority. However, as evidence suggests, this approach was still in progress even 
by the end of October 19411, which is incongruent with any sort of extermination 
decision, possibly taken the same year. Hilberg’s explanation for this incongruity 
is a rather non-convincing one, staking its money on the possibility of an existent 
gap between the advent of the deportation process and the design stage of the gas 
chambers per se2. The 1970s academic trio composed of Browning, Mommsen and 
Broszat further widened the distance between the bulk of theories, in a successful 
attempt to counteract what at the time seemed an outrageous hypothesis put forward 
by extreme right-wing authors and Holocaust deniers such as David Irving. Hitler’s 
awareness of the implemented genocidal policy was for the first time challenged, 
based on the favorable context created by the supposed lack of any written command 
towards the high Nazi hierarchy3. Although failing to demonstrate that the killings 
from the summer of 1941 in Russia were actually part of a continental plan, the above 
mentioned researchers did manage to doubtlessly attest Hitler’s approval of the 
actions. Nonetheless the controversy of this highly debated topic deserves a much 
more thorough analysis, and will be saved for a separate discussion.
The military stagnation of the German army in the East rendered deportation 
practices infeasible, adding up to the pile of frustrating situations the Nazis now 
had to deal with. The territorial subjugation of Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and 
Ukraine, countries with relatively high Jewish populations, was in the end useless 
from this perspective, as it provided no alternative to purify the Reich. The last two 
and a half years, otherwise successful in terms of imperialistic conquest, now brought 
under the German noose millions and millions of undesired elements, with no further 
place to go. This being the case, the assumption that mass killing was implemented 
in a great measure because it proved the only alternative to escape the trap the 
Nazis themselves had been building is not so far-fetched. In fact, the whole killing 
process was firstly initiated at a local level, by individual actions whose experiences 
and results became of paramount importance, offering the perfect example of how 
to deal with such a situation. The institutional character of the policy came only 
afterwards, with the erection of the extermination camps in Poland, in the spring of 
19424. The first to experience such treatments were Jews in the Polish Ghettos, which 
had become overcrowded and infested with disease. Here, local commanders made 
such decisions on a daily basis, routinizing the killings in order to solve the most 
imperative problems, such as maintaining on a reasonable level the storing capacity, 
and making more room for new comers from the Western parts of Europe. 
The extension of Broszat’s thesis came in 1983, when Mommsen characterized 
Hitler’s behavior towards the Jewish policy as being indecisive, and even with a 
compromising appearance. Moreover, in his view Hitler’s employment of threatening 
speeches was seen as a tool, having the purpose of intimidating the international actors, 
when in reality in terms of policy making he was uninformed of the real situation 
1 Gerard REITLINGER, The Final Solution: An Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe, 
1939-1945, Beechhurst Press, London, 1953, p. 81.
2 Raul HILBERG, The Destruction of the European Jews, cit., p. 263.
3 Martin BROSZAT, ”Hitler and the Genesis of the ‘Final Solution’: An Assessment of 
David Irving’s Theses”, Yad Vashem Studies, vol. XIII, no. 20:2, 1979, pp. 73-125.
4 Ibidem, p. 92.
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up until very late1. The Wannsee Conference proved to be in this case much less 
important than originally stipulated, as it presented mass killing as only one among 
many options, preserving its still experimental phase. Jewish physical exploitation 
which was welcomed since the beginning by all Nazi lines acted as a camouflage 
for genocidal actions only later, definitely not in the design stage. Mommsen also 
agrees that the murders were not following any kind of pre-established program, but 
were rather based on improvisations which ended up escalating the magnitude of 
the process: ”Once it had been set in motion, the extermination of those people who 
were declared unfit for work developed a dynamic of its own”2. However, abstracting 
Hitler’s role to such a degree that the killing processes became in their essence 
autonomous was considered dangerous in the whole interpretation of the Holocaust, 
as it was prone to lowering to a certain level the Nazis’ responsibility for their actions. 
The next few pages are dedicated to exploring this particular aspect, meaning Hitler’s 
involvement in the decisional process of a final outcome.
”The sacrifice of millions at the front would not have been necessary if twelve 
or fifteen thousand of these Hebrew corrupters of the people had been held under 
poisonous gas.”3 It is hard to imagine that the same person who could have uttered 
such words 15 years before the beginning of the Second World War, for which he is 
held directly responsible, had nothing to do with the implementation of the Final 
Solution. Hitler’s statements from Mein Kampf should not be interpreted however as a 
recommendation for the future plans, even though as it clearly shows, the idea never 
left his mind. The dictator’s incredible firmness in terms of objective, no matter how 
illegitimate it was, and his success in obtaining the desired aim, meaning the removal 
of Jews from the Reich and its new territorial acquisitions, may seem to offer a direct 
answer with respect to Hitler’s involvement in the decisional process. Nonetheless, 
as already mentioned his participation is almost impossible to prove effectively; or 
at least at first sight. If his perpetual enmity towards the Jewish people can easily be 
testified, the matter of how this reflected and influenced upon his policy making is 
very difficult to establish. In order to be able to reach any kind of consensus upon 
this matter, even after meticulous analysis of available evidence, one must still rely 
on speculations, fact which is all the more concerning when there are very different 
interpretations of the same actions. In light of such scattered pieces of the puzzle, 
which reflect in good measure the overcomplicated bureaucratic style of the Nazi 
leadership, including the Führer, who after the beginning of the war implemented a 
new method of communication relying much more on the spoken word in order to 
avoid exposure of vital information, not many theories have the opportunity to be 
verified4.
As Ian Kershaw observes in his ample research, up until the 1970s the fact that 
Hitler gave a direct order which launched the structured extermination of the Jews was 
1 Hans MOMMSEN, ”The Realization of the Unthinkable: the Final Solution of the Jewish 
Question in the Third Reich”, in IDEM, From Weimar to Auschwitz, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1991, pp. 233, 237.
2 Ibidem, pp. 248-249.
3 Adolf HITLER, Mein Kampf, cit., p. 318.
4 Leni YAHIL ”Some Remarks about Hitler’s Impact on the Nazis’ Jewish Policy”, Yad 
Vashem Studies, vol. XXIII, no. 19:1, 1993, pp. 282-286. 
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unquestionable1. This rather precipitated assumption stemmed from a ”Hitler-centric 
approach to the Third Reich”2 which constantly accentuated the leader’s mentality 
above all other factors. It was only afterwards that the shift in importance from 
individuality of action to the actual composition of the Nazi bureaucratic machinery 
took place, keeping in mind of course the parameters of Hitler’s moral responsibility for 
the implementation of the genocide. The complex structural composition of the Nazi 
state apparatus, with its different agencies constantly competing in terms of policy 
efficiency, led to the controversial idea that after all, Hitler gave no extermination order 
at any moment in time during the war. Instead, the failure of organizing deportations 
according to the plans combined with the unsuccessful campaign in Russia during 
the second half of 1941 constituted the perfect incentives for Gauleiters in the East to 
inaugurate the killing process. Extermination as imposed from the above hierarchy 
came only later, with its gradual transformation into a comprehensive program until 
the next year. Both Mommsen and Browning concur in their views that giving a final 
order for the implementation of mass extermination would have been incompatible 
with Hitler’s modus operandi, especially since according to testimonies he always 
sought to avoid any kind of conversing path that could lead to the subject of a final 
solution, even when dealing with his own factotums. According to Browning, Hitler 
did require the preparation of an extermination plan in the summer of 1941, since 
the following actions of the Nazi leadership would have been unthinkable without 
his permission or demand, but the results of the Nazi brainstorming were rather late 
in coming3. Nonetheless, there are many other variables which must be taken into 
consideration for a better understanding of the whole process. On the one hand, the 
Einsatzgruppen operations in the East were considered as being policy-altering for 
some, leading to a transformation in the Nazi procedural framework. The decision 
that everything should be done in order to reverse the side effect which represented 
the increase of the number of Jews from the annexed territories and the constantly-
arriving information about the killings which were already deployed in Russia by 
July 1941 both signal Goering’s letter as being the further step towards the actual 
implementation of mass killing. The necessity of finding better methods to deal with 
this problem was now of paramount importance, and the context of Jewish emigration 
blockage, the finalization of the camps and the premiere gassing of the Polish Jews at 
Chelmno as certified in December all inferred to a Hitler green light either at the end 
of October or the beginning of November4.
Offering a different kind of approach with regard to Hitler’s input vis-à-vis 
the ordering of the Final Solution is Gotz Aly, who knew exactly how to exploit the 
opening of the former USSR archives after its collapse from 1991. Keeping close to 
Mommsen’s earlier idea of ”cumulative radicalization”5, Aly presumes the decision 
making process as being a very complex one, with multiple visible incitements in the 
months of March, July and October 1941, which were still present under experimental 
1 Ian KERSHAW, ”Hitler’s Role In the Final Solution”, in IDEM, Hitler, The Germans and the 
Final Solution, Yale University Press, London, 2008, p. 95.
2 Ibidem.
3 David CESARANI, ”Introduction” to IDEM (ed.), The Final Solution: Origins and 
Implementation, Routledge, London, 2002, p. 7.
4 Christopher R. BROWNING, ”A Reply to Martin Broszat Regarding the Origins of the 
Finals Solution”, Simon Wiesenthal Centre Annual, vol. I, no. 1, 1984, pp. 124-127. 
5 Hans MOMMSEN, ”The Realization of the Unthinkable…cit.”, p. 212.
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stage by May 1942. In other words, his approach succeeds in reconciling almost all 
other academic factions, especially given the fact that his insight was sustained by 
different regional studies conducted in the formerly occupied territories1. Things get 
really interesting if looking at his interpretation of Hitler’s role in the process, which 
this time is viewed as having the task of moderating and judging different proposals or 
schemes that the Nazi leaders were continuously pushing forward, first in order to get 
the Führer’s appreciation and second, to find a way out of the problems they had been 
creating in the last couple of years. Amongst other motifs which could have pulled 
Hitler’s trigger are enumerated the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich in Prague, a 
theory pushed forward by Florent Brayard in order to link the somehow inexplicable 
comments Himmler made about the Führer’s unusually harsh words when referring 
to the Jewish people in the context of Heydrich’s funerals2, and last but definitely not 
least the signing of the Atlantic Charter already in August 1941, which came as a hit 
for Hitler, who in the context of his strategical failure in the war against the Soviets 
now had to come to terms with the idea of an inevitable war against the United States, 
fact which aggravated his nervous breakdown.
Instead of offering a clear-cut answer to the question revolving around Hitler’s 
involvement in the decisional process of the Final Solution, which by now already 
resembles a Herculean task, the ending part of this discussion is focused on 
clarifying yet another problematic aspect, more exactly the possibility of encryption 
of bureaucratic documents, which we must constantly remember, never mention 
physical extermination, whether written by Hitler, Himmler or any other member of 
those involved in the process. Leaving aside diaries, postwar testimonies or speeches 
which offer a very different alternative when compared to the official bureaucratic 
line of action, post-war studies have come up with the elucidative scenario where 
official documents circulated by the Nazis were actually lying, deliberately using 
terms as ”deportation” or ”evacuation” as code-names for extermination and killing. 
Even though in the early years this was a very attractive thought for students of the 
Holocaust, elucidating many of the unanswered questions, in fact the theory abounds 
in logical contradictions. First of all, because of the cause-effect relation which is 
perfectly observable in the Nazi actions until mid-1941, there is no doubt that the 
utilization of the above-mentioned terms was the proper one, without leading to 
any hidden meaning. The question then arises, how could words have drastically 
changed their meanings and more specifically, how could the lower hierarchy, the 
receiver of the orders be informed of such subtle changes? It was impossible for 
people giving orders to indicate the shift in interpretation of their words at the lower 
level, and as a consequence deduce that the latter had to act accordingly3. Moreover, 
the idea that these changes were somewhere and somehow written down in order to 
be transmitted is in contradiction to the whole purpose of the codification process, 
not to mention assuming the Nazis did so, we would severely underestimate their 
1 Ian KERSHAW, ”Hitler’s Role…cit.”, p. 19.
2 Florent BRAYARD, La ”Solution Finale de la Question Juive”. La technique, le temps et les 
catégories de la décision, Fayard, Paris, 2004, p. 46.
3 For a better understanding of the subject, see Germar RUDOLF, Lectures on the Holocaust. 
Controversial Issues Cross Examined, The Theses and Dissertations Press, Chicago, 2005, 
p. 193. Although widely categorized as a Holocaust denier, his argumentation is indisputably 
presented in an extremely scholarly manner, drawing attention upon both pro- and counter- 
arguments of the Holocaust revisionist thesis.
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thinking capabilities. Performing mass killings at such ample levels did require a 
certain degree of secrecy, hence the permanent silent vocabulary with respect to the 
extermination process, but from there to re-interpreting the orders on such a scale is 
a long way. Since it has already been mentioned, the next part will focus exclusively 
on the concept of secrecy, or more to the point on the connections provided by the 
triangulated relationship between the so-called ”Operation Barbarossa”, the Final 
Solution and the War of Destruction imagined by the Nazis. 
As previously established, it is safe to assume that most researchers agree that 
the implementation of a final solution was never based on a singular, independent 
decision made at a certain point in time. However, accepting that the whole decisional 
process was characterized by incremental events raises some important questions with 
respect to the pivotal nature of some of them, while others, considered less relevant, 
are left in the background. The so-called ”vernichtungskrieg” and its intense planning 
during the spring and summer of 1941 enters under this category, postulating the 
deaths of millions of Soviet civilians, shedding light as always on the Jewish minority. 
The example set in Poland was to leave no room for interpretation when talking about 
the implications this war of annihilation would have on the Russian territory. The 
genocide of Soviet Jews was now a given, with mass executions and starvation being 
thoroughly planned on a much bigger scale and much more organized in terms of 
resources management than in the previous years in Poland. Furthermore, in terms of 
timing of the Final Solution, the debate revolves around the initial positions which puts 
forward the idea that prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union the order to murder all 
Soviet Jewry was still inexistent1. The arrangements which would initiate Operation 
Barbarossa were also responsible for setting in motion the deadly sequences which 
further encouraged the beginning of systematic mass murder, gradually expanding 
the target from Soviet to European Jews.
In spite of the fact that the war of destruction against the Red Army and the 
encompassing Soviet population was already underway, it is very important to notice 
the psychological barriers which still had to be overcome, until the ultimate stage of the 
Final Solution as we now understand it was accomplished. The summer of 1941 still 
envisaged forced resettlement as the answer to the Jewish problem, but as destructively 
conceived as it was, this plan did not escalate to mass extermination policies. However, 
the first couple of weeks of the Barbarossa enforcement helped in creating the lethal 
precedents which, looking in retrospect proved to be real turning points towards mass 
killings2. In this context, the importance of non-German assistance in framing the 
anti-Semitic policy during this period should by all means have its proper share of 
attention.The participation of population from the Nazi occupied territories in violent 
acts against their fellow Jewish neighbors had a significant extent in perpetrating later 
genocidal measures. As Browning identifies, ”the scope of their involvement ranged 
from assistance in identifying, persecuting and ghettoizing Jews to the carrying out of 
pogroms, ‘cleansing measures’ or other acts of violence”3. The best example here for 
sustaining this argument is the case of Lithuania, the Baltic country which prior to the 
war harbored the biggest Jewish population from North-Eastern Europe, and by the 
end of 1943 it had become one of the undeclared Judenfrei areas. 
1 Hannes HEER, Klaus NAUMANN, War of Extermination: The German Military in World 
War II, Berghahn Books, New York, 2004, p. 205.
2 Christopher BROWNING, The Origins of the Final Solution…cit., p. 253.
3 Ibidem, p. 268.
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The invasion of this country on June 22, 1941 allowed the Einsatzgruppen for the first 
time to begin the organization of Jewish killings, making it the place where officially, 
the Holocaust had begun. Moreover, reporting to Berlin, one of the Einsatzgruppen 
commanders who were at the time deployed in Lithuania recounts to his superiors 
the local pogroms which started not later than 25th of June, 3 days after the invasion, 
resulting in 1500 Jewish deaths1. If this is the case, one cannot help wondering if this 
occasionally overlooked aspect had far reaching repercussions for later anti-Jewish 
policies, in the sense that it set the perfect example of how should the situation of the 
Jews be dealt with. As further demonstrated in the third and last part of this paper, the 
Lithuanian case was not unique from this perspective, similar patterns of action being 
observable in the case of occupied Western Ukraine, where local population stood on 
the same side as the Nazis until the very end of the massacres.
The amazing success of the Führer’s military strategy in Russia in the first months 
of action further boosted the Nazis’ confidence in their capabilities, who intended to 
erase all remains of Bolshevism in order to avoid the future rise of any kind of possible 
dangers for the soon-to-be great German Empire. In his euphoric state, Hitler went 
so far in his speeches that he compared himself with a much improved, politicized 
version of Robert Koch, who in his own words, ”has discovered in Jewry the bacillus 
of social decomposition”2. Jews were racially unfit to occupy any place in the colonial 
Garden of Eden envisaged by the Führer, and in the context of victorious military 
outcomes his subordinates had to make an impeccable impression in accomplishing 
their tasks. Further supporting both hypotheses that local actions had a major role in 
deciding the mass killings and that no direct order came for genocide implementation 
is the fact that the commanders of the killing units were informed of the changes in a 
non-uniform manner, at different moments and through different means. However, 
this irregular dissemination of the new policies had little impact in terms of efficiency 
impediments, and by August 1941 already, almost all occupied areas were intensively 
planning and implementing killings at a systematized scale. The following months did 
nothing more than bring about improvements in the killing methods, with Himmler 
and Heydrich effectively putting an end to the long search. In mid-October, they had 
found what they were looking for, and in light of new coming actions, Himmler gave 
the order to immediately stop all Jewish emigrations3. The final part of the paper 
proposes an ample case study having as main objective the analysis of empirical 
evidence concerning policy implementation in Western Ukraine, and the wider 
context it helped develop, thus supporting the idea of a final solution spreading like 
a domino effect, from a micro to a macro scale of action. 
The East-European modern state of Ukraine is one of the newest of the continent, 
but its history has never fallen under the same label. Having a geopolitically charged 
past, mainly characterized by 500 years of different imperial dominations which 
constantly had a regional character (the Habsburgs in Galicia, the Ottoman Empire in 
Bukovina and finally, the Russian Empire) the Ukrainians were late in developing a 
sense of national identity, because of the constant cultural, social and political trends 
1 Dina PORAT, ”The Holocaust in Lithuania. Some Unique Aspects”, in David CESARANI 
(ed.), The Final Solution…cit., p. 159.
2 Max DOMARUS, Hitler. Speeches and Proclamations: 1932-1945, vol. 2, transl. by Mary Fran 
Gilbert and Chris Wilcox, Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, Wauconda, Illinois, 1990, p. 981.
3 Christopher BROWNING, The Origins of the Final Solution…cit., p. 372.
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which were more than often imposed forcedly upon the population. Wasting its one 
chance of developing a separate Ukrainian identity under the Habsburg rule which 
was much more permissive in terms of assimilation of local culture than the Romanovs, 
Ukraine was to encounter all kinds of obstacles which would make it impossible to 
gain any sort of awareness all throughout the 19th century and further on. The active 
Polish resistance to the creation of an independent state, combined with very scarce 
economic resources and a practically inexistent degree of political consciousness, to 
which is further added an organized intelligentsia and even a linguistic fragmentation 
of the regions1, made futile even the thoughts of developing a separate identity of 
the population, which in all fairness was in fact very heterogeneous. Even though 
most of the Ukrainian borders were slowly incorporated into the Russian Empire, the 
Western part remained for several centuries under Polish rule. After Poland’s taking 
over by the Russians however, Galicia and Bukovina were to survive separately from 
the other Ukrainian territories until their forced agglutination during World War II. 
Therefore, Western Ukraine was subjected to a different kind of historical experience, 
which in the context of understanding the formation of national identity of the state 
becomes of paramount importance. Managing to avoid the long Soviet impositions, 
development in terms of identity was different, following the path of a much more 
nationalist approach, which would last even after the gaining of independence from 
1991. Furthermore, because of the historical closeness to the Habsburg Empire, Western 
Ukraine is different in terms of European identity affirmation, which is much stronger 
than in its Eastern counterpart. In light of confronting these variables, it seems easier 
today to understand (yet not justify) why, during the Nazi occupation, the Ukrainian 
local population in this region but not exclusively, had such a major role in the killing 
processes. 
The beginning of the Second World War found a Ukrainian population composed 
mainly of traditional Russian rulers, German settlers, Polish landlords and Jewish 
traders, while the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians belonged to the peasantry2. 
Being hungrily craved because of its potential in terms of agricultural resources and 
human labor force, the Ukrainian space was always prone to exploitation and extreme 
transformations, a sort of danger which along with the rise of Soviet and thereafter 
Nazi imperialism reached its climax. The latter regarded this territory as the soon-to-
be Aryan Lebensraum, having in its composition all sorts of German establishments, 
such as agricultural colonies, military equipment and necessary SS gears3. Hitler’s 
delusions with respect to Ukraine being comparable in terms of usability with India 
helped a great deal in altering policies and behavioral patterns of Nazi elites, who 
tried by all possible means to colonize the territory during the War.
The military conquest of Ukraine in the summer of 1941 was followed by the 
arrival of Nazi personnel who, at the sight of local conditions, was rendered speechless. 
The Soviet stamp from the last decade had remained visible especially in the rural 
areas, which made up almost the entire territory. For the Germans, the unbearable 
living conditions provided nothing more than a confirmation of the ”subhuman” 
1 Paul KUBICEK, The History of Ukraine, Greenwood Press, London, 2008, p. 68.
2 Wendi LOWER, Nazi Empire-building and the Holocaust in Ukraine, The University of North 
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2005, p. 2.
3 Dirk MOSES, Empire, Colony and Genocide: Conquest, Occupation and Subaltern Resistance in 
World History, Berghahn Books, New York, 2008, p. 279.
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status of the Slaves, further stressing the immediate need for accomplishing their 
mission and making visible progress as fast as possible. Ironically enough, the Nazi 
leadership even acknowledged the benefits of Stalin’s domination over Ukraine, as 
it set the perfect base for the future German empire-building. The ethnic Ukrainians 
knew nothing more than to live under imperialism and constant war; for them, 
the changing of the occupation was only nominal, passing from the Soviet to the 
German whip1. However, not all regions viewed the arrival of the Nazis with the 
same amount of pessimism. In Western Ukraine and more specifically the Zhytomyr 
region, because of the intensively promoted Western stereotypes and the tragic events 
involving the recent Soviet rule, citizens naively welcomed the Germans, clueless of 
the terrors they were about to endure. Not only that, but living in memory of the 
first German occupation during World War I, which was benefic in economic and 
cultural terms, they willingly provided the Nazis with the demographic situation of 
the entire region, thus alleviating them from a great amount of work. In the context 
of a blitzkrieg strategy which intended to erase to a certain degree the current Eastern 
settlements, the Wehrmacht couldn’t afford wasting valuable time on dealing with 
civilian population. Once again, Zhytomyr was a particular case in the sense that 
here, the army, the police and the SS set-up a separate administration specifically 
designed as to play a leading role until the civil leadership was programmed to arrive 
in November the same year. During the five months when Himmler and his SS were 
officially in charge, the regime unleashed its murderous campaign which focused on 
a careful selection of victims, not only from among the Jews, but alsofrom the ranks of 
Soviet POW and other unwanted elements, be it of racial or political considerations. On 
the other hand, the German-Ukrainian relations from this period are often described as 
”a honeymoon”2 from the perspective of the omnipresent consensus and the provided 
opportunities. The Soviet withdrawal meant that Ukrainian nationalists could start 
preparing the ground for obtaining independence. Moreover, the positional shifts in 
the societal strata immediately became visible, with the German minority being all of 
a sudden elevated to the proper Aryan level to which they belonged, while for Jews 
the future was starting to seem unpredictable, at best. The initial approach of the 
Germans with respect to the local population nourished the latter’s hopes that on this 
occasion things will much improve. Exploiting the circumstances of their invasion, 
the Nazis managed in creating an anti-Bolshevik foundation of their expedition, thus 
portraying themselves as ”god sent liberators”, taking advantage of the region’s 
powerful religious drives3. Propaganda machinery which on every occasion called to 
the Ukrainian people made use of religious rites in order to promote its anti-Semitic 
ideology, encouraging and instigating on every occasion local initiatives which 
oftenled to Jewish pogroms.
As for the nationalist movements which operated on the ground, they were 
deceptively convinced by the Nazi cooperative behavior that they would even benefit 
from support in obtaining their goal. Their faith in the success of the operation was 
so strong that they established certain bonds with the German army and the SS, 
1 Wendi LOWER, Nazi Empire-building…cit., p. 30.
2 Ibidem, p. 31.
3 Karel C. BERKOFF, Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule, Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 147.
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helping in the final preparations of Barbarossa1. The false illusions would soon be 
crushed by German authorities and the conflict arising from the obvious divergence 
of interests will be settled in favor of the latter, who firmly sought to place the local 
German minority into key-positions of the towns and villages, thus interfering with 
the nationalists’ plans to improve the local living conditions. Nonetheless, from 
the perspective of inter-ethnic relations what is interesting to observe in this case is 
that, although Ukrainians saw the Volksdeutsche together with the Jewry as possible 
threats to their status, in fact up until the arrival of the Nazis in the summer of 1941, 
the Zhytomyr population was much more radical in stigmatizing the Polish and 
Russian minorities, which due to the historical conflicts were still seen as the main 
antagonists2. The incubation of interethnic tensions never had the chance to manifest 
itself on a practical level, except for the Ukrainian-Jewish relations which on the 
background of Nazi agitations took on much more violent displays. The credulous 
Ukrainians soon realized that the Nazi administration wouldn’t provide the expected 
results, counterbalancing their considerate attitude towards religion and nationalist 
movements with the already known policies of intimidation and mass violence. 
The five months military occupation of the Western part of Ukraine with its 
administrative center in the city of Zhytomyr brought along the merciless execution 
of tens of thousands of Jewish civilians, actions legitimized by the ongoing war and 
the already discussed euphoria of victory of the German troops on the Eastern front. 
The rigorous administrative structure imposed in the beginning by the military, with 
its preserved hierarchical pattern and anti-Semitic doctrine was to remain stabilized 
until the 1944 Soviet return, thus opening the way for more mass killings to take 
place in an unquestioned and unpunished manner. Trying to come up with a suitable 
characterization of the fresco, the telling features that come to mind are first of all 
the surprisingly numerous acts of indigenous collaboration, the draconic security 
measures against all civilian population along with the mass punishments in case 
of infringements and lastly, the continuous economic exploitation which left the 
population in abject poverty during and after the Nazi withdrawal. Moreover, in 
order to fully understand the nature of the events one must not neglect the central 
role played by the SS police forces coordinated by Himmler, which acted as a despotic 
force on both civilian and military administrations. Although organized in an 
irreproachable manner from the executive point of view, enjoying permanent help 
from the local administration which was being exploited to serve the Nazi goals, the 
military rule was chaotic on all other levels. The Führer’s regional appointees hardly 
managed to reach any sort of consensus with respect to the manner of ruling of each 
occupied region, except for the area of security measures which were by all intents 
and purposes equally strict. Contextual challenges such as severe economic deficits 
and all sorts of administrative complications, up to and including overcrowding and 
inhumane conditions of the ghettos and provisional camps for Jewish civilians and 
POW, were settled through the use of violence and terror, on most occasions used 
randomly and without accountability by the Nazi enthusiasts, which weren’t few in 
1 Wendi LOWER, Nazi Empire-building…cit., p. 38.
2 Karel C. BERKOFF, ”Was There A Religious Revival In Soviet Ukraine Under The Nazi 
Regime?”, Slavonic and East European Review, no. 3, July 2000, p. 548.
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numbers1. This temporal interval of only a few months constituted the tragic point 
of convergence of different variables, an intersection which became lethal in terms of 
racial policies. 
Unquestionably, the contemptuous final solution(s) alternative to the Jewish 
question and their extermination as a race began not in the gassing chambers of 
Auschwitz, but in rather isolated East European locations such as Zhytomyr2. The 2 
million Jewish victims claimed by the Nazi machinery from North-Eastern Europe 
died almost integrally on the spot, in full view of the ”racially fit citizens”, who more 
than occasionally even pulled the trigger. Unlike the industrial and impersonal style of 
the gassing procedures, in Ukraine the killing processes reached a much more intimate 
level in the sense that the concepts of justification of the murders, the carelessness 
or participation of the witnesses and the victims’ traumatic experiences acquire a 
very important socio-psychological extension. Zhytomyr’s Jewry is of paramount 
importance for understanding, as historian Dieter Pohl says, ”the transition from a 
selective policy of destruction to one of total eradication” and the mechanisms which 
helped making the successful passage3. Furthermore, from a regional perspective, 
the analysis of the course of events during the years of occupation provide useful 
information with respect to the Nazified administrative structures, the importance 
of hierarchical distributions and social dynamism which made possible the mass 
extermination of the unwanted elements. In addition, the constant presence of the 
Nazi elite in the region and its interaction with the lower hierarchy provide further 
understanding of the Reich’s structural division and the relations between the groups 
and individuals. The vague definition of expectations when talking about the ordering 
of a final solution practically gave all local commanders free hand in approaching the 
Jewish policy, thus adapting the harsh measures to local conditions. Nonetheless, like 
all efficient machineries, this one also needed more than a powerful engine in order 
to accomplish its goals. The SS, the SD and the police needed two important pillars 
upon which to found their work, more specifically the full partnership of all German 
departments in the region and the active support of the indigenous population. In the 
end, they got even more than they were initially hoping for. 
Ironic as it may seem, although Ukraine was the country with the biggest 
Jewish concentration after Poland, its significance in understanding the Shoah was 
often overlooked. Subjects such as Jewish forced labor, both German and Ukrainian 
civilian participation in massacres and denunciations did not constitute an attraction 
point for researchers of the topic until very recently, with the post 1991 opening 
of the Ukrainian archives4. The general knowledge of the Holocaust in Ukraine is 
resumed at the events from Babi Yar in the fall of 1941, or at best the whole military 
administration period until November, the same year. The initial phase which set 
off the extermination process, regarded from a localized perspective such as the 
case of Zhytomyr and its surroundings provide crucial evidence in promoting the 
hypothesis that the murder of the European Jewry was never planned ”in the meeting 
1 Theo SCHULTE, The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia, Berg, Oxford, 
1989, pp. 289-292.
2 Wendi LOWER, Nazi Empire-building…cit., p. 69.
3 Dieter POHL, ”The Murder of Ukraine’s Jews under German Military Administration and 
in the Reich Commissariat Ukraine”, in Ray BRANDON, Wendi LOWER (eds.), The Shoah in 
Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2010, p. 301.
4 Wendi LOWER, Nazi Empire-building…cit., p. 71.
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rooms of the Nazi leadership”1, but developed as such on the ground, following the 
snowball effect. The general assumption is that the exact date at which the decision 
of extermination was made is impossible to verify. What is clear however is that 
regardless of the motives, the dramatic increase of the killings during the months of 
August and September which also changed their primary targets, going from male-
only to inclusion of women and children, was ordered from a higher-ranked position. 
Therefore, instead of wasting precious time in search of an officially documented 
order which might or might have never been given, it would be much more fruitful 
in terms of results to actually try and reconstruct the connection between the killings 
ascent and interactions of leaders and local subordinates which in the end led to the 
promotion of a policy of eradication at the state level. 
Although initially concerned of the possibility of a negative reaction from the 
part of the Wermacht, the Einsatzgruppen took advantage of the instrumentality of 
warfare in order to allure the former into embracing the Führer’s ideological affinities 
in terms of racial policy2. A very prolific collaboration between the three parties – 
the Wermacht, the SS and the police – was established at a formal level preceding 
Operation Barbarossa, between Heydrich and Quartermaster, General Eduard Wagner. 
Although at the high hierarchical level things were clear from this perspective, the 
different local and regional configurations this brand new alliance formed after the 
invasion still remain in the shadows. Apart from socially bonding over their jobs, the 
created link between officers, commanders and soldiers led to a very well coordinated 
manner of action which on a certain level eased the psychological discomfort of the 
executions. As Lower observes in her study, what struck most when analyzing Nazi 
administration on the ground was the perfect division of labor that the SD and the 
military laid out, which was most visible in the events following the month of August 
in Zhytomyr. Individual collaborations were also exploited in order to get the best 
out of the situation, perfectly demonstrating how agencies with partially different 
objectives merged around the Holocaust. 
The average Ukrainian ”Volk”, in its overwhelming majority belonging to the 
peasantry, continuously sought all throughout the war and implicitly the Nazi 
occupation to preserve its previous living arrangements, which plainly speaking 
referred mostly to agricultural subsistence. Nonetheless, the socially higher-ranked 
Ukrainians ended up, forcedly or not, working with both military and civilian German 
administrations. Standing out from the bulk of state employees, the influential 
Ukrainian police was by far the most enthusiastic in performing its genocidal tasks, 
systematically chasing the Jewish population on every occasion. Little wonder that 
the only documented evidence of the Ukrainians’ role in the implementation of the 
Final Solution is provided by the German records, which vaguely stipulate the duties 
of every recruited auxiliary police unit, thus making research of the problem even 
more difficult than anticipated3. 
When addressing the issue of influence of the German occupation upon the 
behavioral pattern of the local citizens, one cannot ignore the fact that the context 
created by racialist thinking brought to the surface certain types of criminal tendencies. 
Although the problem of establishing if in fact pogroms took place spontaneously or 
1 Dieter POHL, ”The Murder of Ukraine’s Jews…cit.”, p. 236.
2 David CESARANI (ed.), The Final Solution…cit., p. 58.
3 Wendi LOWER, Nazi Empire-building…cit., p. 90.
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they were exclusively instigated by the Germans is somehow doubtlessly clarified by 
Nazi reports which claim that most violent outbursts were provoked by themselves, 
one cannot generalize to such a degree the course of events1. In the city of Zhytomyr for 
instance, to the miscalculation of the Nazi leaders, the population was disinclined in 
helping with the anti-Jewish policy implementation, refusing to take any kind of active 
measures against their Jewish neighbors. The Nazi administration took advantage 
however of the historically imposed anti-Bolshevik feelings of the Ukrainians, and 
equated them with the anti-Semitic ones through manipulating methods and intense 
propagandistic actions. What resulted is not very hard to imagine: local Ukrainians 
were convinced of the evilness the Jews provoked, and started taking matters into 
their own hands in order to liberate their lands.
Participation in the Holocaust was also extremely high among the members 
of nationalist Ukrainian organizations, who in light of pursuing their fantasies 
with respect to independence, helped the Germans on many occasions in rounding 
up and identifying the Jewish population. Although this pro-German orientation 
wouldn’t last long, especially after the Nazis incorporated Galicia (the mother-land of 
nationalist movements) into the Generalgouvernement, Ukrainian nationalists still lived 
under the strong impression that for their country ”the lesser evil was Hitler and the 
greater evil, Stalin”2. Following to the letter this slogan, they continued their bloody 
quest of liquidating Jews until the very end of the war, in part because of associating 
them with Bolshevism, but also to comply with the German will. Fundamentally, the 
Ukrainian cooperation to mass killings can be explained through the historical context 
of the Nazi occupation, generally being analyzed as an unfortunate conjunction of 
skillful German recruitment processes, brutalization of the previous Soviet rule and 
the psychological state of war, which helped in lowering inhibitions to the point that 
murder became a normalized action, not only for trained soldiers, but even for the 
common citizen. 
In terms of complexity and sensitivity, Holocaust studies practically offer no 
comparative background, no matter how attractive this aspect may seem today when 
seeking to obtain certain political purposes. From a purely theoretical perspective, the 
most interesting peculiarity of this rather unique event is not the innovation brought 
on by the gas chambers, but the pseudoscientific concepts which the Nazis embraced 
and later created in order to destroy the supposedly European ”common enemy”. 
As hopefully demonstrated in this paper, the extremely racial ideology obsessively 
promoted by National Socialist doctrine did not lead to an inevitable genocidal 
path, but rather pushed forward the idea that any sort of territorial German-Jewish 
cohabitation was for all intents and purposes impossible. Nonetheless, no matter 
how unique in terms of ideological motivation, the Holocaust’s final number of the 
victims’ count (even the most exaggerated results) do not stand out, if compared for 
instance to the causalities produced by deliberate famines imposed in communist 
Russia or China. Moreover, comparing in proportional significance, the 1994 Tutsi 
indiscriminate slaughter in Rwanda surpasses the Nazi results, the former having an 
1 John Paul HIMKA, ”Ukrainian Collaboration in the Extermination of the Jews during 
the Second World War: Sorting out the Long-Term and Conjunctural Factors”, in Jonathan 
FRANKEL (ed.), The Fate of the European Jews: 1939-1945. Continuity or Contingency?, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1998, p. 172.
2 Ibidem, p. 194.
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extinction rate of over 75%, while European Jews had an estimate of between 57 and 
67% of the pre- War numbers1. Under no circumstances should these comparisons be 
intended to underestimate the contribution of the Holocaust in understanding the 
genocidal boundaries, especially since it helps a great deal in preventing or limiting 
this kind of future behavior. In this sense, the individuality of each innocent victim and 
his or her suffering surpasses the status of grammatical fiction, once again reminding 
humanity that immortality can be achieved in more than one way. 
With respect to drawing a conclusion on the decision making process and 
implementation of the Final Solution, no matter how hard one tries certain things 
will always remain unexplained, and certain hypothesis unverifiable. The amalgam 
of inter-dependent variables which have to be taken into consideration irrespective 
of the road we chose to adopt will almost exclusively result in the discovery of new 
discrepancies. Chronological correlations such as the one between victory in the East 
and radicalization of anti-Jewish measures are indeed very plausible, indicating rather 
a cumulative process towards mass extermination, which very much depended on the 
continuously changing circumstances and last but not least on the local conditions. 
Yet, after in-depth analysis there is one conclusion which stands out before anything 
else: the Final Solution as we now understand it initially presented a much localized 
character, emerging in places such as Ukraine and the Baltic Countries, where the 
Nazis’ perfectly structured administrative framework and a local population driven 
towards collaboration by its pregnant historical past converged to the point that 
genocide became part of daily life. 
The Ukrainian case study this paper proposes as a departure point for understan-
ding the genesis of the Final Solution is an attempt at shedding light upon the 
omissions researchers have made so far in tackling the Holocaust. The unfortunate 
geographical position of Ukraine, which on the continental map was always at the 
crossroads, first between the Entente and the Central Powers and three decades later 
between the Allies and the Axis Powers offered the perfect context to ravage on two 
different occasions its territory, unwillingly hosting the two most powerful armies of 
the world battling for supremacy. After 1941, as a future Nazi colony Ukraine became 
ground zero for the onset of the Holocaust. Surprisingly or not, before the German 
occupation Ukraine was no stranger when dealing with Jewish pogroms. The end of 
the 19th and beginning of the 20th century brought along differently located massacres 
of the Jewish minority, having as main protagonist the Ukrainian rural population. 
Interesting enough, these violent escalations coincided with the decisive changes of the 
Tsarist regime, somehow following in scope and intensity, as Elias Heifetz observes, ”a 
course parallel to that of the revolutions”2. Considering the historical evidence which 
indicate deeply-rooted anti-Semitism, we can take a step further in understanding 
why the Holocaust was possible on such a scale on Ukrainian territory.
One final important aspect which would make a good research subject is the 
consequence of Ukrainian partition from 1941 in relation to the multiple interpretations 
of the Holocaust as seen today. After the invasion, Hitler once again dismantled the 
Ukrainian territory, parts of which were incorporated to the General Government 
1 Benjamin A. VALENTINO, Final Solutions. Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth 
Century, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, The United States of America, 2004, p. 178.
2 Elias HEIFETZ, The Slaughter of the Jews in the Ukraine In 1919, Thomas Szeltzer, New 
York, 1921, p. 1.
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and Romania, thus dashing to the ground Rosenberg’s dream of creating a unified 
Ukrainian state under German suzerainty1. Consequently, Holocaust in Ukraine is 
today analyzed almost exclusively in connection to the Wermacht administrative 
territories and the Reich Commissariat Ukraine. Looking at the situation from a 
purely technical angle however, the events from Galicia should belong to Holocaust 
in Poland, while Holocaust in Romania should also include the region of Transnistria, 
same as Transcarpathia should be analyzed with Hungary. These historical distinctions 
in interpreting the events clearly demonstrate the important role of occupiers, be them 
Germans or Russians, in implementing genocidal policies throughout the region they 
ruled. Nonetheless, demographic data speaks louder than the nature of territorial 
occupation, in the sense that the majority of the population in each of these zones was 
unquestionably Ukrainian. Moreover, no matter the 1941-1945 inauspicious division, 
almost all ruptured pieces now make up the independent state of Ukraine. 
As for the genocidal experience of the war and the importance of the Holocaust 
in drawing lessons, analyzing what came after (Yugoslavia, Rwanda) we can only 
conclude what we already suspected: that history teaches us no lessons. Most probably, 
as sociologist Robert Merton cleverly argued, if men define situations as real, then they 
will become real in their consequences2. As expected, the tragic events involving the 
Jewish people left a huge red stain on behavioral developments for almost all peoples 
of the continent. National identity in several parts of Europe is now less deep, less 
passionate and less extreme in its demands. In post-war Germany, this debate took on 
a particularly delicate character, having profound moral and political roots. The Nazi 
experience caused a high degree of anxiety and moral crisis, leading to instability and 
distrust in the country’s post-war institutions. Not being able to make peace with its 
own past, German national identity was bound to become entirely future-oriented. 
Sometimes being reluctant with regard to their own nationhood, many Germans took 
advantage of the context of European integration in order to link inextricably to a 
wider democratic community. Living in fear that genocide is still possible on such 
a systematized and state-organized scale would be incongruous, basically because 
masses have become almost impossible to mobilize in a similar number as during 
the wars, due to the unlimited number of options available (politically, socially and 
economically). But it wouldn’t hurt to take a glance into the past once in a while, just 
as a quick reminder that choosing not to believe in the Devil, won’t protect us from it. 
No matter what ”Devil” may epitomize here.
1 Wendi LOWER, Ray BRANDON (eds.), The Shoah in Ukraine…cit., p. 2.
2 Jacques SEMELIN, Purify and Destroy. The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 2007, p. 85.
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